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ABSTRACT 
This paper engages with Elizabeth Grosz's critique of the conception of desire thought in terms of "lack," and argues that rather than 
rejecting this concept, it is necessary to disengage it from its historical association with the denigration of the female other and the 
ontologization of desire itself. 
RESUME 
Cet expose entre en concurrence avec la critique d'Elizabeth Grosz sur la conception du ddsir percu comme un "manque" et soutient 
qu'au lieu de rejeter ce concept, il faudrait le dissocier de son association historique avec le denigrement de la femme autre que 
l'ontologisation du desir meme. 
DESIRE, L A C K AND THE PROBLEM OF 
OTHERING 
This paper is an exploration of the concept of 
desire. Specifically, I want to ask whether it is 
possible to "think" desire outside what Elizabeth 
Grosz (1995b) has recently called the "ontology of 
lack," which, she argues, has dominated its 
conception in Western thought since antiquity. In 
this understanding, desire is thought as an absence, 
lack, or "hole" in human "being," seeking to be 
filled or given substance. This ontology begins with 
Plato, is taken up by Hegel, and finds contemporary 
expression in psychoanalysis, especially in Lacan 
(Grosz 1995b, 176). As Grosz rightly notes, this 
model of desire is especially problematic for 
feminists, for it has traditionally been both 
sexualized and heterosexualized; in other words, 
the language of lack and absence versus presence 
and substance has historically been coded in terms 
of the binary opposition between male and female 
(178-9). 
To these observations I would add the 
following proposition: because the language of lack 
has been ontologized, because it informs our 
conceptions about "being," it is also reflected in 
dominant notions of authentic and proper selfhood 
in general. For this has also been expressed 
historically in binary terms of presence and 
absence; the paradigmatic subject of Western 
modernity is the self which needs to be self-
identical, to discover and protect its own subjective 
"truth," and requires the establishment of the 
outside, antagonistic "other" to accomplish this. In 
short, desire as lack has become entwined with 
subjectivity and identity itself - specifically, with 
the kind of subjectivity which posits and maintains 
as "other" any thing which cannot be reduced to 
itself, to its own logic. 
Given this problem, feminist attempts to 
rethink desire outside the terms traditionally 
associated with desire as lack - as a binary, 
heterosexist model of presence and absence - are 
especially relevant, and go beyond simply 
articulating feminine and lesbian desire. Irigaray's 
(1985; 1985a) use of the "language of essence" in 
her critique of Lacan is a case in point here; as are 
Judith Butler's (1993 a) metaphor of the lesbian 
phallus, and Teresa DeLauretis' (1994) account of 
lesbian fetishism. A l l of these in different ways 
rework the terms of psychoanalysis, perhaps the 
most infamously "phallogocentric" discourse in 
Western philosophy, destabilizing it from "within." 
In spite of the value of such explorations, 
Grosz argues that they mistakenly remain within 
the terms of the problem - which lies not just in 
psychoanalysis, but in the very notion of "lack" 
itself. In her view, it is time to leave this model, 
with its implications of inferiority, depth and 
negativity, behind us and to experiment with 
alternative ways of understanding desire altogether. 
To do this, she draws on what she refers to as a 
secondary, less privileged history of the concepts of 
desire and of corporeality existing alongside the 
trajectory defined by Plato, Hegel and Lacan. This 
begins with Spinoza, and can be found in 
Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari - all 
of whom focus on desire as a corporeal, productive 
phenomenon of bodily surfaces, rather than 
expressive of inner depths or psychic meanings 
(Grosz 1994a, 116). 
My primary interest here is not to undertake a 
systematic comparison of these theorists, or to 
assess the relative merits of a Deleuzian versus a 
Lacanian approach to understanding lesbian desire 
(DeLauretis 1991; Grosz 1995a), but to ask two 
crucial and related questions which I think are 
raised by Grosz's critique: first, can desire be 
rethought outside "lack?" and secondly, does the 
discourse of lack have to be ontologizeal It seems 
to me that framing these questions together is 
crucial. For it may be that desire cannot be 
imagined outside of "lack," as the desire for the 
presence of something. However, in my view what 
this "presence" is or "will be" is entirely open-
ended - the motion of desire does not have to be 
dictated by the terms of phallocentrism, 
logocentrism, or anything else. Indeed, I believe 
that it is precisely the ontologization of the "lack" in 
desire which allows for, and even requires, that it 
be framed within these kinds of singular logics. For 
it is only in assigning "being" or "presence" to 
desire that its inherent fluidity and volatility can -
and must - be contained according to some pre-
given purpose or end. 
In my view, therefore, while Grosz's call to 
develop alternatives to the "ontology of lack" is a 
timely one, the same cannot be said for her 
argument that the notion of "lack" itself must be 
abandoned altogether; for thinking desire as lack 
and thinking desire through an ontology of lack 
have very different implications. While the latter is 
characterized by sexism and heterosexism, and is 
organized around the logic of "othering" in general, 
the former has no necessary connection to these 
problems. Indeed, as I will argue, desire thought as 
lack is potentially a more fruitful concept for 
feminists and other critical theorists than Grosz's 
proposed alternative. 
HEGEL AND THE ONTOLOGIZATION OF 
"LACK" 
This claim will of course seem problematic, 
given the historical association of lack and 
negativity with the denigration of the other in 
Western philosophy and cultural practice. Without 
underestimating the systematic and often brutal 
reality of this association in all its forms, I believe 
that it is essential to emphasize its contingent nature 
- its historical rather than inevitable status. In my 
view, the historical entrenchment of this process 
does not entail its logical inevitability. Thus it is 
important to trace the roots of the association of 
"lack" with the "other" as a historical process. And 
as I will argue, a crucial aspect of this association 
has been precisely the ontologization of the lack in 
desire. 
For this reason I begin with Hegel, although he 
is one of the more conservative members of the 
Western philosophical "canon" - in terms of both 
his autocratic pronouncements about the "nature" of 
women and their "place" in his philosophical and 
political system, and of the totalizing nature of this 
system as a whole. As many critics have pointed 
out, his thought is both phallocentric and 
logocentric. So what could Hegel have to say to 
feminists? And what could he possibly have to offer 
in the way of a lesbian rethinking of desire? 
The short answer here is that Hegel's thought 
has indirectly impacted much feminist, as well as 
lesbian and gay discourse on sex and sexuality -
specifically, through his influence on Lacan, who 
adopts a Hegelian notion of desire in his analysis of 
ego formation (Dean 1992,48-50). More generally, 
Hegel provides the first, and certainly the most 
systematic, articulation of the integration of desire 
and subjectivity in its modern form, where 
primordial lack is turned into an active drive to 
subsume the other as a condition of self-integrity. 
Thus his writings illustrate the connection between 
the ontologization of the lack in desire and the 
problem of othering. 
At the same time, Hegel's approach also 
indicates that the notion of lack can be used to 
undermine this dynamic. For the most radical 
implications of his dialectic are tied in with this 
principle, even though Hegel himself imposes 
ontological closure on it. In particular, his view of 
reality as fundamentally relational and mediate - as 
process rather than substance (1967, 80) hinges on 
the notion of lack. For Hegel, it is because finite 
reality is not adequate to its concept, and elements 
are not complete in themselves (1991a, 84-88), that 
history "happens;" reality is a dynamic process 
motivated by these contradictions. 
Hegel's understanding of subjectivity is central 
to this approach and it is here that the notion of 
desire as "lack" comes in. Desire for Hegel is what 
constitutes the "I," or self-consciousness itself 
(1967, 225), and is thus what motivates history. 
And this is precisely because desire is a lack. For as 
an emptiness, an absence, it c/wquiets and unsettles 
the subject, requiring it to act (Kojeve 1969, 3); it 
receives real positive content only through the 
destruction, assimilation, or transformation of the 
object (Hegel 1967,224-25). 
Thus desire per se does not exist in a positive 
or substantive manner - it is realized through its 
negative relation to the real or present given (for 
example, the act of drinking is the negation of real 
water) (Kojeve 1969, 134-35). Human desire, 
which creates self-consciousness, is directed 
beyond present reality, toward desire itself, which 
is oriented to an imagined future reality. It is this 
desire for the desire of another self-consciousness -
the struggle for recognition - that inaugurates a 
dialectical process in which self-consciousness 
develops within and through social and historical 
development (Hegel 1967, 228-67). 
The significant point here is that the movement 
of history operates on the principle of negativity, 
through the contradictions or gaps arising between 
concrete experience and the abstract concepts 
growing out of this experience (Hegel 1967, 96-7; 
136-37). In terms of the desiring subject, the 
process depends on the principle of lack - on the 
fact that the self is not innately "there" as an 
autonomous and self-contained being, but requires 
the recognition of the other to supply this being 
(229). The process is therefore potentially infinite, 
or at least open-ended, precisely because desire is 
understood as a lack; the desire for recognition is 
inherently unfulfillable because its "object" is the 
desire of another, which is not a present "thing" that 
can be obtained once and for all. 
However for Hegel, as is well-known, there is 
an end to this process. History is propelled by an 
ever unsatisfied desire for recognition by the other, 
but there will be an ultimate reconciliation or 
synthesis of self and other, subject and object, and 
an end to history, when Absolute Spirit is realized 
in the world (Hegel 1967, 138). This can be 
understood as an ontologization of, an assigning of 
"presence" to, the interconnected concepts of 
subjectivity and desire; through Hegel's imposition 
of a final and comprehensive totality, the volatility 
of these things is contained, and history is made 
into a closed system. 
The connection of this metaphysic to the 
problem of "othering" is clear. Hegel's notion of our 
primordial communality, his insight that identity is 
constituted in and through otherness (1967, 81), is 
undermined as the recognition of the other is turned 
into the reduction of the other to the self. For 
invoking this final closure and unity is effectively 
an act of violence, of assimilation, in which 
difference is absorbed, defined only in relation to 
the singular logic of Spirit. Thus, as everything is 
incorporated into this logic, the specific "otherness" 
of the other is not recognized - or rather, it is 
measured as "other" only in relation to the self 
(Derrida 1986; Levinas 1981; Adorno 1990; 
Cornell 1992). 
The definition of "Woman" as "man's" other in 
Hegel's system is one of the more striking examples 
of this dynamic. Indeed, it's arguable that the 
"othering" of women is not only inextricably linked 
to the logical hierarchy of the system as a whole, 
but necessary to it; the female "principle" is in 
general the passive and "undifferentiated" moment 
in the realization of concrete universality (Hegel 
1970, 368), and women themselves are integrated 
into the process precisely (and exclusively) in their 
particular and "immediate" roles as wives, mothers, 
sisters, and daughters of men (Hegel 1967, 466-99; 
1991, 158-219). Women's "place" is therefore 
always already decided: the totalizing logic of the 
system can only allow for their recognition as 
"other" in relation to men. 
What this excursus into Hegel shows, 
therefore, is that it is the teleological closure 
imposed on his system, and not the principle of 
"lack" within it, which leads to the association of 
"lack" with the phenomenon of othering - and that 
this is accomplished precisely through the 
ontologization of lack. As Absolute Spirit is posited 
as the presupposition and final end of the dialectical 
movement of history and human development, a 
singular ontological "presence" of a definitive and 
directed future is imposed on desire and 
subjectivity. The volatility and fluidity of these 
things, their open-endedness in terms of the future, 
is contained as the lack in desire itself is assigned a 
"content." Thus the lack which connects the self to 
the other (via the desire for recognition) is 
transformed into a definitive lack in the other. 
L A C A N AND THE PHALLOCENTRISM OF 
L A C K 
This process is carried over into Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, where it is expressed in the 
infamous phallocentrism of his thought, fo r what 
we find in Lacan is a tension or discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, a radical rewriting of 
subjectivity and desire as fundamentally mediated, 
fluid and social; and on the other hand, the 
imposition of a kind of teleological closure on the 
process through the equation of culture and 
language (the symbolic order) with paternal rule. 
As with Hegel, this tension can be understood by 
way of Lacan's ambiguous approach to the principle 
of "lack." It is through this principle that he 
formulates a conception of the ego that, as Grosz 
says, unsettles "the presumptions of a fixed, 
unified, or natural core of identity" (1990, 48-9); 
and it is through the ontologization of lack that the 
pre-given and unified subject is effectively 
reintroduced at the level of the "whole" - namely, in 
the structure of language and the unconscious. 
Lacan incorporates Hegel's understanding of 
human beings' primordial lack into Freud's 
argument about the "narcissistic" formation of the 
ego - that the ego depends on its images of others 
for its identity - and comes up with a fundamentally 
relational and fluid conception of the self (Dean 
1992,48-50). Like Hegel's "I" structured by desire, 
the developing subject in Lacan is not 
fundamentally "present," but anticipatory, oriented 
to the future (the search for a coherent identity), 
and purchased through a loss (of its imagined 
"oneness" with the world). The ego is not a prior or 
self-identical substance, but a projected image of 
bodily contours and boundaries - an unstable site of 
identificatory relations (Butler 1993a, 74-75). 
As with Hegel, the development of the self in 
Lacan is motivated by a constitutive lack or 
contradiction - in this case, between the child's 
experience of fragmentation and alienation and its 
identification of itself as a unified totality. The 
subject seeks to fill this lack (which is unfillable) 
through a series of identifications - ultimately 
assuming an independent, speaking position in the 
symbolic order. Desire is what regulates this entry 
into language and law, and like Hegel's desire, it 
operates on the principles of negation and lack. It is 
a movement of substitution that creates a series of 
equivalent objects to fill the constitutive lack of 
subjectivity; initiated through the oedipal 
prohibition, it is an effect of language and the 
unconscious that creates an endless chain of 
substitutions for the perpetually absent/lost and 
forbidden object (Grosz 1990, 50-67). 
Thus the assumption of independent 
subjectivity (as a speaking "I") in the symbolic is 
also phantasmatic, and never absolute. At the same 
time, the symbolic itself, as defined by the paternal 
law of kinship, is assigned absolute status by Lacan 
- which means that the gender hierarchy through 
which subjectivity is constituted is universalized. 
For he posits the phallus as the single defining term 
in the linguistic construction of the subject - as the 
crucial signifier in the distribution of authority and 
a speaking position, and also of the lack marking 
castration. For Lacan, it is the "signifier of 
signifiers" - a representative of the structure of 
language and of signification, both of which 
themselves operate through lack, or the gap 
between signified and signifier. By means of the 
phallus, the subject comes to occupy the position of 
"I" in discourse; by means of signification as lack, 
the subject can use language in place of a direct or 
unmediated relation to nature or the "Real," which 
it must relinquish (Grosz 1990, 121-25). 
Lacan denies any inherent, causal connection 
between the penis and the phallus, which, as a 
signifier, is not an organ or an imaginary 
projection, but part of the relational linguistic 
system of the symbolic. The father's "difference" is 
thus redefined in terms of linguistics, the 
unconscious, and social relations - the child's 
submission is to "paternal metaphor" rather than the 
biological father per se. So the castration complex, 
seen by Lacan (as by Freud) as crucial to the child's 
entry into culture, is understood in a narcissistic 
rather than an anatomical sense; it involves not the 
imagined loss of a penis, but the imagined loss of 
fusion with the mother, through the introjection of 
the father's phallus conceived as a signifier (Grosz 
1990, 98-105). 
Thus the "lack" attributed to women 
(especially to the mother) is not an anatomical or 
"Real" lack, but rather a linguistic and unconscious 
construction necessary for men to be construed as 
"having" the phallus (for no one can really possess 
it). The penis takes on the function of the phallus 
only because there are those that lack it; it is the 
mark or trace which produces the exclusion of 
women as it produces the illusion of masculine 
"completeness" and self-sufficiency, by 
representing women as corporeally lacking or 
incomplete. Women are thus regarded as castrated, 
and men as "having" the phallus, because of the 
illusory identification of penis and phallus - the 
penis becomes the defining characteristic of both 
sexes by its presence or absence. 
Although the equation of penis and phallus is 
illusory and misrecognized, however, it is still for 
Lacan what constitutes human desire, and the 
symbolic order itself. It is through this fantasy of 
identification (of penis and phallus) that the phallus 
operates as the signifier of lack - the marker of 
presence and absence; and thus as the universal 
term which differentiates the sexes, assigning one's 
place in the symbolic as "having" or "being" the 
phallus. For it is precisely because the phallus is not 
the penis - the negative connection between these 
things - that it is able to signify (Butler 1993a, 84). 
As the privileged signifier of lack, the phallus is 
therefore assigned what Grosz calls an "a priori 
masculine privileging" - it is assigned a masculine 
status before its cultural and symbolic inscription 
(Grosz 1990, 123). Butler (1993a) describes this 
move as a "performative" one; the assertion of the 
phallus as a privileged signifier and not an 
imaginary effect or projection, is itself constitutive 
of the privileging of the phallus. For if it were an 
imaginary effect, it would be as decentered and 
tenuous as the ego itself (82). 
With this move, a kind of ontological closure 
reminiscent of Hegel is imposed on subjectivity and 
desire; while the assumption of the "Name of the 
Father" is rarely entirely "successful" (Grosz 1990, 
47), it is still posited as the definitive future which 
gives meaning to the present. And this "totality" 
hinges even more explicity than Hegel's on the 
"othering" of women in particular; as Grosz points 
out, both sexes are distinguished not on the basis of 
(Saussaurian) linguistic difference, where each term 
is defined by all the others, but in terms of a 
dichotomous opposition: not as "A" and "B," but as 
"A" and "not-A" - where one term (A) is somehow 
prior in relation to the others, and defines these by 
its presence or absence (1990, 124; 139). Thus, 
while Lacan emphasizes the slippage in language 
that prevents gender identity from ever being 
finally guaranteed or linked to an outside referent, 
he posits the semantic structure of gender as frozen 
or fixed in and as the unconscious itself (Cornell 
1992, 86). 
The connection of this rigid erection of sexual 
difference in/as the unconscious and the 
logocentrism found in Hegel is evident; both, as 
Drucilla Cornell explains, "set Woman's place in 
stone through an appeal to an unshakable system 
and to the truth of the whole" (1992, 78). Is it then 
possible to "think" desire as lack without repeating 
the logic of phallocentrism and the problem of 
"othering?" But this question also indicates that 
lack itself is not the "cause" of the problem; rather, 
it is precisely when lack is assigned such a 
"presence" as part of a larger totalizing ontology 
that it becomes coded as sexual polarization and the 
denigration of the other. 
REFIGURING DESIRE: BEYOND LACK? 
This returns us to the questions raised at the 
outset: can desire be rethought outside the discourse 
of "lack?" and must this discourse necessarily be 
framed as an ontology? What I have tried to show 
with the preceding discussion of the "ontology of 
lack" in Hegel and Lacan is that these two questions 
must be framed together; for it is only if the latter is 
not asked that the former arises. It is when "lack" is 
ontologized that it becomes necessary to abandon 
the term altogether; for as we've seen, this 
framework operates on the principles of exclusion 
and "othering" in general, and in the case of 
psychoanalysis in particular, implies the 
impossibility of women's, and especially of lesbian, 
desire. 
This conflation of the principle of lack with the 
"ontology of lack" is, I would argue, what underlies 
Grosz's rejection of the principle of lack tout court 
as a means to understand desire. Indeed, she at 
times seems to slide between the historical 
association of lack with, for example, 
phallocentrism, and the assumption that these are 
necessarily connected. Thus she argues that an 
alternative notion of desire, such as that proposed 
by Deleuze and Guattari: 
... cannot be but of interest to feminist theory 
insofar as women have been the traditional 
repositories and guardians of the lack 
constitutive of desire, and insofar as the 
opposition between presence and absence, 
reality and fantasy, has traditionally defined 
and constrained woman to inhabit the place of 
man's other. Lack only makes sense insofar as 
some other, woman, personifies and embodies 
it for man. (Grosz 1994, 165) 
But why should lack necessarily require the 
"othering" of "woman," or indeed any other social 
category of people, or of things at all? Or, to put 
this another way, what underlies the need to "make 
sense" of lack in the first place? - to assign it some 
definable ontological presence? What Grosz's astute 
observations on this point reveal is precisely the 
historical entrenchment of the association of lack 
with the "other" in western thought and cultural 
practice. But they beg the question of how this 
association has come about, and in particular, of 
the ways in which it is tied in with the 
ontologization of lack. 
Because this latter issue is not addressed, 
moreover, the processes by which lack has been 
ontologized also remain unexamined in Grosz's 
argument - namely, those by which lack is invested 
with the "presence" of some overall normative 
version of truth and "reality." And this analytical 
gap is carried over into her assessment of 
alternatives to this discourse: when Grosz proposes 
that we "refigure" desire in terms of Deleuzian 
"intensities and flows," the possibility that the same 
kind of proclivity toward ontological closure may 
be found here is not fully considered. Indeed, it is 
because the models upon which Grosz bases her 
proposed alternative to the "ontology of lack" do 
elide negativity and lack that equally totalizing 
views of the nature of "reality" find their way in. 
Rather than Hegel or Lacan, Grosz suggests we 
take our cue from Spinoza, who saw desire as a 
"positivity or mode of fullness which produces, 
transforms, and engages directly with reality" 
(Grosz 1994a, 222 n.l). In Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983) in particular, she argues, this approach is 
taken up in an especially radical and promising 
way, for they explicity adopt Spinoza's conception 
of the "univocity of being." Here all things -
human, animal, textual, sociocultural and physical 
bodies - are assigned the same ontological status. 
This means, for example, that subject and object, 
and "inner" and "outer," can no longer be 
understood as binary opposites, or even as discrete 
entities; these must be seen, rather, as parts of a 
"series of flows, energies, movements, strata, 
segments, organs, intensities" (Grosz 1994, 133 and 
167). Difference itself is also thereby 
reconceptualized - it can no longer be 
"subordinated" to identity, but must be understood 
as something "in and of itself (164). Unlike 
Derrida's notion of differance or the trace marking 
the inherent impossibility of presence (i.e., as 
something negative), Deleuzian difference is 
thought as force, affirmation, action and effectivity 
(Grosz 1995, 129). 
Desire in this view is conceived as an 
"actualization" rather than a yearning based on 
lack; it does not aim for an object, but only for its 
own self-expansion (Grosz 1994, 164). It is thus 
nomadic, unpredictable, and creative; defined as a 
"process of production without reference to any 
external agency" or to any internal need for unity 
and self-certainty, it opposes "organism" itself -
organization, function and structure. Thus, what is 
created (and fragmented) in the movement of desire 
are "assemblages" - provisional linkages between 
"elements, fragments, flows"; ideas and things 
which all have the same ontological status (167-70). 
Presence and absence are thus replaced with a 
notion of "pure" and open-ended "becoming" -
what bodies aspire to is pure surface, intensity, and 
flow, not unity or oneness. For bodies in this 
conception are no longer seen as unified or 
unifiable organisms, centered either physiologically 
or psychologically; they are, rather, elements or 
fragments of "a series of desiring machines." When 
the body is freely amenable to the flows and 
intensities of the "desiring machines" that compose 
it, it becomes the "Body without Organs;" not a 
transcendent body, but one "in abundance" of its 
own organic organization, in direct relation "with 
the flows and particles of other bodies and things" -
a tendency to which all bodies aspire (Grosz 1994, 
168-69). 
As Grosz argues, this approach avoids the 
problems of sexual polarization and the positing of 
"woman" as other which is so crucial to the 
"ontology of lack." Since the very terms of 
presence and absence, inner and outer, and subject 
and object are jettisoned, no singular standard or 
thing can be assigned ontological priority, and no 
particular difference can be assigned the status of 
the denigrated other. Indeed, this framework is 
therefore fundamentally non-hierarchical - it 
refuses to seek (and by definition cannot seek) a 
single explanatory logic or exemplary paradigm. 
Grosz notes that Deleuze and Guattari have 
been criticized by feminists for, among other 
things, appropriating feminist theory and politics 
while neutralizing women's sexual specificity 
(1994, 161-64). For example, because of women's 
subordinated status in patriarchal society, the 
metaphor of "becoming woman" is posited as "the 
law" for the destabilization of binary unities found 
in all becomings; and the figure of the "girl" (as 
"the site of a culture's most intensified 
disinvestments and recastings of the body") is set 
up as the universal (and hence decorporealized) 
equivalent of the transgressive interderminacy of 
becoming in general (174-82). Grosz argues that in 
spite of these kinds of shortcomings, Deleuze and 
Guattari can still contribute to a much-needed 
feminist refiguring of desire - for their work "does 
not have to be followed faithfully to be of use in 
dealing with issues that they do not, or perhaps 
even cannot, deal with themselves" (such as lesbian 
desire). Specifically, we can still take advantage of 
the fact that they "refuse to understand desire in 
negative terms" or to "structure it with reference to 
a singular signifier, the phallus," and that "they 
enable desire to be understood not just as feeling or 
affect, but also as doing and making" (1995b, 180). 
To this I would respond that, again, negativity 
does not necessarily require the structuring of 
desire around a singular signifier; and that, as seen 
in the discussion of Hegel and Lacan, desire 
thought in terms of lack is fundamentally 
productive - in that it is necessarily an activity 
rather than a "thing." As an activity, it is the mark 
of our inherent relatedness with others - a 
relatedness which is not "external" to the self, but 
which rather precedes and constitutes the self 
(Butler 1991, 26-7). Moreover, this productiveness 
has no necessary "destination" dictated by "lack" 
per se - this is imposed when the principle of lack 
is invested with an ontological "presence," itself 
accomplished through the adoption of some 
totalizing view of the nature of reality. 
In fact, I would argue that it is precisely the 
"refusal" to allow the principles of lack and 
negativity into their understanding of desire that 
allows for Deleuze and Guattari's omission of 
sexual difference in their analysis; and I would add, 
moreover, that this refusal makes it difficult to use 
their approach consistently without repeating this or 
similar problems of neutralizing qualitative 
differences. 
This problem can be traced to the adoption of 
Spinoza's monistic conception of "being" as a way 
to theorize difference; in Hegelian terms, this 
forecloses mediation because it denies 
contradiction. This is not to say that ontological 
divisions are required to account for difference, of 
course (Hegel's own system is a critique of this 
notion); but rather that difference must be thought 
in relational terms - which entails a negative 
"moment" between the different elements. 
Moreover, negativity does not have to carry 
hierarchical connotations; in other words, it does 
not logically require that some particular elements 
(subjects, identities, concepts, or whatever) must 
provide the privileged (normative, teleological or a 
priori) standard against which other elements are 
measured. Similarly, the distinction between subject 
and object, self and other, and inside and outside, 
does not necessarily have to entail antagonism, 
violence, and exclusion; this, as I've argued, is a 
historical development, not a logical or inevitable 
one. Attempting to "flatten out" such distinctions 
themselves, rather than focusing on the ways in 
which they have been historically constructed as 
oppositions, does not address this process. Indeed, 
this can itself be seen as a "totalizing" move which 
undermines the open-endedness of "becoming" 
which Deleuze and Guattari (and Grosz) want to 
emphasize. 
Grosz herself cautions that Deleuze and 
Guattari seem to imply the existence of an 
inevitable process of increasing fragmentation, 
which is random in occurence, but has an apparent 
pre-given destination; "[they] imply a clear 
movement toward imperceptibility that is in many 
ways similar to the quest of physics for the 
microscopic structures of matter, the smallest 
component, the most elementary principle" (1994, 
179). In my view, this is a totalizing process 
reminiscent of Hegel's own - the movement is in the 
opposite "direction" (towards dissolution rather 
than identity), but just as monolithic in its result; 
and perhaps even more so - for we can ask whether 
the process has a final destination where all things 
are dissolved, and hence reduced to sameness. 
Adopting a conception of difference as a thing 
in itself, a "pure" positivity, in other words, 
undermines any meaningful account of 
differentiation - of how things become 
differentiated and identified, how they relate in 
time. For it seems to me that it is impossible to 
conceive of time itself without some notion of 
differentiation through negation - where each 
present moment is constituted through the negation 
of a past one. This means that activity and change 
themselves cannot be accounted for, for activity, 
including the activity of becoming, is necessarily 
temporal; it happens in space, but also through 
time. As Butler says, "an act is itself a repetition, a 
sedimentation, and congealment of the past which 
is precisely foreclosed in its act-like status." Indeed, 
she argues, construction itself, including the social 
inscription of bodies, can be understood as process 
of "sedimentation" of temporal acts - a kind of 
spatialization of time through the postulation of 
discrete and bounded "moments" (1993, 244 h.7). 
These kinds of processes, I would argue, 
cannot be adequately theorized through such a 
singular notion of reality or being, which 
effectively reduces time to space. Thus, for 
example, the conceptualization of the body as an 
inscribed surface, the effect of power and 
knowledge (Foucault 1979, 1980) does not address 
the processes by which this very construction and 
inscription is also one of differentiation and 
exclusion; as Butler argues, which bodies don't 
matter is as important a question as how bodies are 
"materialized" (1993). 
Accounting for the movement of desire is 
problematic in the same sense; it is described as a 
series of practices and as an actualization, but the 
temporal nature of this motion is obscured. In 
effect, desire is itself given "presence" - ultimately, 
it must be defined as some kind of "life force" 
aiming at self-expansion, the intensification of the 
"flows" of life. While this indeed gives us an 
account of desire that is both creative and nomadic, 
it does not tell us much about its operations through 
time, especially the ways in which it is enacted as 
the "sedimentations" described by Butler. Thus the 
"productivity" and "creativity" of desire is itself 
undertheorized. 
I would argue that thinking desire as "lack" is 
the only way to conceptualize its temporal nature. 
For if desire is an absence, it can only "be" through 
temporal acts in space - it is not a spatial "thing" in 
itself. Moreover, it is this temporality which 
constitutes the inherent open-endedness of desire; 
as I've argued, there is nothing necessarily either 
teleological, phallocentric or logocentric in thinking 
desire as "lack." Desire is fundamentally the 
absence of presence; but this does not have to mean 
that it is always the absence of the presence of the 
phallus, or of Absolute Knowledge, or of any 
teleological final end or realization. Indeed, linking 
the "lack" of desire with these things is precisely 
what constitutes its ontologization, the attempt to 
make it "present;" and this process can only be 
understood as the reiteration and enactment of 
existing "sedimentations" of power relations (such 
as the subordination and "othering" of women). 
In short, thinking desire in "Hegelian" terms, 
as the absence or lack of a future that we seek to 
make present - in other words, as an activity which 
is oriented to the future - does not have to be 
shaped by Hegelian (or Lacanian) conclusions. The 
future that we desire does not have to be a pregiven 
one - like the full "self-presence" of Absolute 
Knowledge. The "nomadic" nature of desire, in my 
view, is "given" precisely by its "lack;" this is what 
makes desire open-ended, contingent, and 
fundamentally relational. What this tends toward is 
not the totalization and closure invoked by Geist, or 
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the unity and self-identity of subjectivity, or the 
reduction of all discourse to the singular logic of 
the phallus. These things themselves are historical 
"sedimentations" of human relations and activities, 
which are marked by, and indeed require, the 
establishment of the excluded, opposition "other" as 
a condition of their existence and "truth." The 
association of presence and absence, completion 
and lack, with the binary opposition of male and 
female is a part of these historical processes, not the 
"lack" of desire per se. Indeed, what thinking desire 
as "lack" says to me is that it is radically open-
ended; that it speaks to the future, and that the 
future is unwritten. 
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